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Hardee: The Constitutionality of Automobile Compensation Plans in Wyoming

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF AUTOMOBILE
COMPENSATION PLANS IN WYOMING
The question of the constitutionality of the various automobile compensation plans is one that has been overshadowed
by the debate over the merits of the plans themselves. Since
the issue is one that may ultimately affect the citizens of Wyoming, a discussion of the proposals' validity under the Wyoming Constitution is warranted. The following is a digest
of four of the major automobile compensation plans (Green,
Columbia, Saskatchewan and Basic Protection), an analysis
of the possible barriers to these plans under the Wyoming
Constitution, and a determination of their constitutionality
in Wyoming.
The least revolutionary of the four is the Green plan
(1958).1 Under it the owner of a vehicle would be required
to purchase insurance before he could register his automobile.
The insurance would be an accident policy accruing to the
benefit of anyone injured by the vehicle, regardless of fault.
Exempted from coverage are attempted suicides and persons
committing a criminal offense other than a traffic violation.
Administration of the rates of insurance, classificaton or risks,
determination of coverage and related matters would be
handled by the State Insurance Commission. The handling of
claims and determination of loss would be handled by the
courts. The present system of common law damages would
be retained for the determination of loss with the exclusion
of any recovery for pain and suffering.
The Columbia plan (1932)2 is patterned after the workmen's compensation acts. Under this plan the owner of a
motor vehicle would be required to show a certificate of insurance before he would be allowed to register his automobile.
The insurance, like the Green plan, would be accident insurance to cover all persons injured by a vehicle without reference
to fault. There would be three exclusions from recovery
under this plan:
1. No recovery would be allowed for willful injury. This
exception would cover the two situations which would
1. GREEN, TRAFFIC VICTIMS: TORT LAW AND INSURANCE, 87-89 (1958).
2. Compensation for Automobile Accidents: A Symposium, 32 COLUM. L. REV.
785, 798 (1932).
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be excluded from coverage under the Green plansuicide and criminal offenses.
2. No recovery would be given the driver in a one party
accident. In order for the driver to collect under a
policy he must be injured by a collision with another
motor vehicle. He would then be covered under the insurance on the other vehicle.
3. No recovery would be afforded to any party injured
by an insured vehicle if that vehicle was being driven
without the owner's permission at the time of the accident.
Unlike the Green plan which leaves the determination of
damages to the present common law system, the Columbia plan
would include a scale of benefits, similar to present workmen's compensation benefits, which the injured party would
receive in place of any tort action. The scale would include
medical expenses, loss of earnings (the first week of wage loss
would be excluded and payments would be equal to two-thirds
the weekly wage or a set minimum) and lump sum payments
for disfigurement or death. No compensation would be made
for pain and suffering. Property damage would not be included under the plan and is left to the common law remedy.
The Saskatchewan plan (1946)' is presently in existence
in Saskatchewan. All owners are required to present a certificate of insurance before they can register their automobile,
but in this case the government is the insurer. All premiums
paid go into a central fund from which all persons injured
by the operation of a vehicle within the province (state) are
compensated without regard to fault. To be compensated a
person need not be covered by an insurance policy or be injured by an insured automobile. Thus, a pedestrian who is
not insured and who is injured by a nonresident, uninsured
vehicle recovers under the plan. Excluded from coverage
under this plan are suicides, drunk drivers, and persons who
are riding on parts of the vehicle not designed for the carriage
of passengers. The plan includes an extensive schedule of
specified benefits with lump sum payments for death. Aside
from the accident coverage just described, the insurance also is
3. 12 ELM. 2, ch. 38 (Saskatchewan)

(1964).
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for property loss and liability. The reason these two types of
insurance are required under the plan is that the present system of tort liability would be retained. Essentially, the victim of an accident may choose between accepting the benefits
offered or pursuing his common law remedy. If an injured
party elects to sue he must set off any amount received under
the accident policy against the judgment. Liability is in no
way limited by the schedule of benefits or the amount of the
mandatory policy.
The last and currently most prominent of the automobile
compensation plans is the Keeton & O'Connell Basic Protection plan (1964).' As in the prior proposals, the purchase of
insurance would be required before a motor vehicle could be
registered. The policy coverage would be basically accident
insurance. Payments would be made to anyone injured by
the operation of an insured vehicle within the state regardless
of fault. The benefits under the plan are similar to present
medical insurance payments-compensation only for actual
loss. Rather than make a lump sum payment, the payment of
benefits is made on a monthly basis. Persons injured by the
operation of an insured vehicle within the state would receive
compensation for actual medical costs and out-of-pocket costs
(such as loss of wages) in monthly intervals as the claims are
proven. There would be no compensation for pain and suffering, no coverage for property loss, and no collateral benefits rule (all payments are for net loss). As proposed the
basic protection policy would cover losses up to $10,000 per
person. Above that limit, tort liability would arise under any
one of the three following situations:
1. When the injured party's claim exceeds $10,000;
2. When death occurs; or
3. When a person's share of the single accident amount is
less than $10,000 and inadequate.
The present tort system of fault and damages (including pain
and suffering) would be in effect above the $10,000 level.
4. Keeton and O'Connell, Basic Protection-A Proposal for Improvnig Automobile Claims Systems, 78 HARv. L. REv. 329, 356-81 (1964).
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Although each plan has peculiar features of its own, the
three basic constitutional issues which will be discussed are
the same in each plan. These issues are:
1. Does the state have the power to compel the purchase
of an automobile insurance contract and to regulate
the terms of that contract?
2. Do the benefits fixed by the plans as compensation
in lieu of tort action violate the right to trial by jury?
3. Are the plans in conflict with the no limitation on
damages clause of the Wyoming Constitution?
To enact any of the plans discussed under a constitutional
law theory the legislature must rely on the police power provision of the Wyoming Constitution: "it shall be the duty of
the legislature to protect ...the public welfare." 5 In constru-

ing the police power under the Wyoming Constitution, the
Wyoming Supreme Court has declared that the determination
of what measures are proper for furtherance of police power
rests in the legislature so that if a statute furthers the object
of the legislature by reasonable and appropriate means, the
wisdom of the law is for the legislature.' The court has further stated that the "courts, employing a standard of reasonableness as applied to the facts, are the final arbitrators as to
whether the law is an unwarranted invasion of rights guaranteed by the Constitution." 7 Since the legislature must rely on
the courts for interpretation of what is reasonable and appropriate, a study of the possible constitutional limitations of the
police power is in order.
The greatest limitation of the police power in Wyoming is
the Wyoming Constitution due process clause which provides,
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law."' The Court exercised this limitation
in declaring an act of the legislature, which required any
owner or company who contracted for the construction of a
ditch, canal, or reservoir to secure a bond from the contrctor
for the payment of suppliers and laborers or to become liable
to the full extent of such debts, to be unconstitutional insofar
5. WYO. CONST. art. 7, § 20.
6. State v. Langley, 53 Wyo. 332, 84 P.2d 767 (1938).
7. Bulova Watch Co. v. Zale Jewelry Co. of Cheyenne, 371 P.2d 409 (Wyo.
1962).

8. WYO. CONST. art. 1, § 6.
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as the liability exceeded the amount the property was benefited. A further restriction that the bond be purchased
from a surety or guaranty company authorized to do business
in the state was held to be in violation of the state constitutional liberty to contract under the due process clause.'
In a recent decision declaring the Wyoming Fair Trade
Act" unconstitutional, the court held that the term liberty,
under the due process clause, encompasses not only the liberty
to contract but also the liberty not to contract. The defendant
was a nonsigner of a minimum price contract which under the
Fair Trade Act was to apply to all retailers in the state once a
single retailer had signed. The court declared that the defendant had the liberty not to contract. While neither property nor contract rights are absolute the exercise of the police
power must be reasonable and designed to accomplish the
end desired."
In determining what the effect of the due process limitation might be on compulsory insurance in Wyoming, it must
be recognized that the construction of the due process clause
in the United States Constitution by the United States Supreme Court is persuasive. The closest analogy to compulsory
insurance in existence presently is the Massachusetts compulsory liability insurance law.1" Shortly after the law was
enacted its constitutionality was challenged on the ground
th at it was a violation of due process. The plaintiff contended
that the insurance rates were prohibitive and that since he
could not pay them the state was denying him the liberty to
drive without due process of law. In dismissing the case the
United States Supreme Court held that no substantial federal
issue was raised because, "its unsoundness so clearly results
from the previous decisions of this court as to foreclose the
subject and leave no room for inference that the question
sought to be raised can be the subject of controversy. "1 In substantiating the fact that the state has the police power necessary to enact this type of statute the court cited Opinion of the
9. George Bolln Co. v. North Platte Irr. Co., 19 Wyo. 542, 121 P. 22 (1912).
WYO. STAT. §§ 40-8 to -17 (1957).
11. Bulova Watch Co. v. Zale Jewelry Co. of Cheyenne, supra note 7.
12. MASS. GEN. LAWS, eh. 90 (1958).
13. Ex Parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30 (1933).
10.
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Justices,1 4 Hess v. Pawloskip5 and Hendrick v. Maryland.16 In
the Hess case the issue was whether the state of Massachusetts
could provide by statute that the registrar of motor vehicles
was the agent, for purposes of service, of any nonresident using the highways of the State. The United States Supreme
Court held that, "the State may make and enforce regulations
reasonably calculated to promote care on the part of all, residents and nonresidents alike, who use its highways." 17 Wyoming presently has a statute very similar to the one in
the Hess
case except that the Secretary of State is the designated official who shall serve as agent and it extends to residents of the
state on whom process cannot be served within the state."8 In
Hendrick the plaintiff sought to overthrow a Maryland statute
which required nonresidents who were residents of Washington, D.C., to register their automobiles and obtain a driver's
license from the state of Maryland (the state also required
the payment of the normal fees) before using the state highways. The United States Supreme Court held that the law
was a reasonable exercise of the police power of the state to
control the state highways."
The Opinion of the Justices was a discussion of the validity of the act as posed by questions from the legislature
to the Supreme Court of Massachusetts. The court upheld
the validity of the act and stated that the state had broad policing power in the matter of highways. Since the safety of the
highways is the responsibility of the state, it should have broad
powers to enact safety legislation in regard to them. The court
also upheld the validity of the legislature's action in fixing the
rates and terms of the insurance companies policies.2"
The legislature's power to regulate the motor vehicle
area is stronger when considered in the light of a majority of
decisions which hold that driving is not a right but a privilege
granted by the state: "There is no inherent or constitutional
right to drive a dangerous automobile on the highway, and
whether one shall be permitted to exercise the right and under
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Opinion of the Justices, 251 Mass. 569, 147 N.E. 681 (1925).
Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610 (1915).
Hess v. Pawloski, supra note 15, at 356.
Wyo. STAT. § 1-52 (Supp. 1969).
Hendrick v. Maryland, supra note 16, at 622.
Opinion of the Justices, supra note 14.
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what conditions and restrictions is a matter for the legislature. I In answer to our first question, the Supreme Court
of the United States has replied in the affirmative. The
state does not possess the power to compel the purchase of
automobile insurance and to regulate the terms of that contract.
As to the second question which inquires whether the
substitution of benefits for tort action is a violation of the
right to trial by jury,2" the nearest analogy in Wyoming is the
Wyoming Workmen's Compensation Act.2" Soon after passage of Wyoming Workmen's Compensation Act, a suit was
brought by an employee of the Central Coal & Coke Company
for damages received as a result of on-the-job injury."4 On the
issue of violation of the right to trial by jury the court said
that the due process clause only guarantees that the existing
law will be followed-it does not say that the law cannot be
changed. Once the law has been changed by the legislature
through a reasonable exercise of the police power from a tort
liability system to a system of benefits fixed by law, all that
remained as a remedy for the employee was the fixed scale of
benefits. The employee's former rights are removed and new
rights substituted. Since the police power can replace the
common law remedies with a new set of rights which are fixed
as between the employee and employer, there is no issue for a
jury to decide.25 This objection could arise under three of the
four plans discussed: The Green and Columbia plans which
completely remove common law actions and the Basic Protection plan which removes common law remedies below the
$10,000 level. Using the analogy to workmen's compensation,
these plans would suffer no constitutional disability under
the Wyoming Constitution.
The third question is one which arises because Wyoming
is one of the few states which has a constitutional prohibition
against limiting damages for personal injury and death.2" Do
the set schedules of benefits violate this prohibition? An
analogy to the workmen's compensation act is again helpful.
21. State v. Demerritt, 103 A.2d 106, 108 (Me. 1953).
22. WYO. CONST. art. 1, § 9.
23. WYO. STAT. §§ 27-48 to -168 (1957).
24. Zancanelli v. Central Coal & Coke Co., 25 Wyo. 511, 173 P. 981 (1918).
25. Id.
26. WYO. CONST. art. 10, § 4.
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To facilitate the passage of Wyoming's Workmen's Compensation Act, a constitutional amendment was passed in 1914
which exempted extrahazardous activities from the prohibition. 7 The issue of the amendment's scope was raised in
Zancanelli v. Central Coal d Coke Company 8 and the Wyoming Supreme Court held that the amendment must be construed as the latest will of the people and as being in harmony
with the workmen's compensation law since it was adopted
solely to allow enactment of the law. Because of this rationale
any conflicting portion of the constitution must give way to
the amendment. However, the amendment does not embrace
the area of automobile injuries.
Since the Wyoming Supreme Court has stated that the
police power of the legislature is expressly limited by the Wyoming Constitution 9 and the remainder of the clause prohibiting the limitation of damages is still in effect, it is essential
that in order to institute a program which would limit damages
in the automobile injury area a constitutional amendment
should be considered. Only two plans would encounter trouble
with this clause-Columbia and Basic Protection. It is obvious that the set awards and set fee for death under the Columbia plan is a limitation on damages. The problem arises
under the Basic Protectionplan when a cause of action arises
below the $10,000 limit.
The constitutionality of all the plans, discussed in relation
to the three constitutional issues raised, is (with the possible
limitation of the need for an amendment to the no limitation
of damages clause) apparent. However, without becoming
involved in the merits of each plan it is clear that the plan
which could be adopted in Wyoming with the least amount
of controversy over constitutionality is the Green plan. Both
of the major changes proposed by the plan (the instituting
of compulsory insurance and the elimination of common law
actions) are constitutional under Wyoming law. There is no
conflict with the limitation on damages clause since the damages for each case are determined by the court.
27. Id.
28. Zancanelli v. Central Coal & Coke Co., supra note 24, at 991.
29. Bulova Watch Co. v. Zale Jewelry Co. of Cheyenne, supra note 7, at 417.
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Since any of the plans could ultimately be adopted by the
legisuature and be upheld as constitutional under the Wyoming Constitution (assuming that appropriate amendments
are made if necessary) the question of constitutionality has
been satisfied and the debate over the merits of the plans themselves will remain relevant.
JAMES A. HARDEE
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